Springer OnlineFeedbackHelpJobs and Careers
   


 

Advanced search
 
AboutBrowseFavoritesTable Of Contents & Keyword AlertOrders ProfileOrder History LogOff

Article

Theory and Decision
Publisher: Springer Science+Business Media B.V., Formerly Kluwer Academic Publishers B.V.
ISSN: 0040-5833 (Paper) 1573-7187 (Online)
DOI: 10.1023/B:THEO.0000044593.23976.07
Issue: Volume 55, Number 3
Date:  November 2003
Pages: 273 - 287
Oligarchy for Social Choice Correspondences and Strategy-Proofness

Yasuhito TanakaContact Information

(1) Faculty of Economics, Doshisha University, Kamigyoku, Kyoto, 602-8580, Japan. E-mail

Abstract  We study the existence of a group of individuals which has some decisive power for social choice correspondences that satisfy a monotonicity property which we call modified monotonicity. And we examine the relation between modified monotonicity and strategy-proofness of social choice correspondences according to the definition by Duggan and Schwartz (2000). We will show mainly the following two results. (1) Modified monotonicity implies the existence of an oligarchy. An oligarchy is a group of individuals such that it has some decisive power (semi-decisiveness), and at least one of the most preferred alternatives of every its member is always chosen by any social choice correspondence. (2) Strategy-proofness of social choice correspondences is equivalent to modified monotonicity.

modified monotonicity - oligarchy - social choice correspondences - strategy-proofness - weak dictator


Contact InformationYasuhito Tanaka
Email: yatanaka@mail.doshisha.ac.jp

The references of this article are secured to subscribers.



  
Previous article
Next article
Export Citation: RIS |  Text
Linking Options
Send this article to  
  
Full Text Secured
The full text of this article is secured to subscribers. To gain access, you may:
   Add this item to your shopping cart for purchase later.
   Purchase this item now.


Frequently asked questions | General information on journals and books


© Springer. Part of Springer Science+Business Media  |   Privacy, Disclaimer, Terms and Conditions, © Copyright Information

Remote Address: 219.29.72.93 • Server: MPWEB17
HTTP User Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; ja-JP; rv:1.7.6) Gecko/20050311 Firefox/1.0.1